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Summary. - Social movements have been viewed as vehicles through which the
concerns of poor and marginalized groups are given greater visibility within civil
society, lauded for being the means to achieve local empowerment and citizen
activism, and seen as essential in holding the state to account and constituting a
grassroots mechanism for promoting democracy. However, within development
studies little attention has been paid to understanding how social movements can
affect trajectories of development and rural livelihood in given spaces, and how
these effects are related to movements' internal dynamics and their interaction
with the broader environment within which they operate. This paper addresses
this theme for the case of social movements protesting contemporary forms of
mining investment in Latin America.

On the basis of cases from Peru and

Ecuador, the paper argues that the presence and nature of social movements has
significant influences both on forms taken by extractive industries (in this case
mining), and on the effects of this extraction on rural livelihoods. In this sense
one can usefully talk about rural development as being co-produced by
movements, mining companies and other actors, in particular the state. The terms
of this co-production, however, vary greatly among different locations, reflecting
the distinct geographies of social mobilization and of mineral investment, as well
as the varying power relationships among the different actors involved.

Keywords: social movements; rural development; extractive industries; Peru; Ecuador;
Andes
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1. INTRODUCTION: MINING EXPANSION AND SOCIAL
MOBILIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

The 1990s saw significant shifts in global investment flows in mining, an effect of
changes in national regulatory frameworks in over 90 countries worldwide (Bridge, 2004;
Holt-Giménez, 2007). One of the many consequences of these changes has been that an
increasing share of investment has flowed to South America. Between 1990 and 2001
twelve of the twenty-five largest single capital investments in mining were made in South
America, two in Peru, nine in Chile and one in Argentina (Bridge, 2004: 412, 413). Four
of the top ten target countries for mining investment were Latin American: Chile (ranked
1st), Peru (6th), Argentina (9th) and Mexico (10th). Chile and Peru have been particularly
favored by neo-liberal reforms, receiving more investment than might otherwise have
been predicted on the basis of their geological attributes alone (Bridge, 2004). Such
surges and shifts in global investment geographies are mirrored at a national level. In
Peru, for instance, by 2000 three departments2 had between 30 and 50 percent of their
terrain under mining claims, and a further seven had between 20 and 30 per cent (Bury,
2005). Claims are particularly concentrated in highland departments characterized by
historically neglected agrarian economies and significant indigenous and campesino
populations.

Accompanying this growth in investment in extractive industries has been an equally
remarkable surge in social mobilization and conflict (Bebbington, 2007a, b). For
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example, in 2005 a report to the Peruvian Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman's Office)
recorded thirty-three separate conflicts related to mining (Ormachea, 2005). The nature,
scope and extent of this mobilization and these conflicts vary across space, however, as
does the mineral investment itself.

Indeed, the intersections of these two distinct

geographies – one of investment, the other of social mobilization – goes a long way in
determining the uneven geographies of the relationship between mineral development
and patterns of rural territorial change.

This observation is the starting point for this paper. We explore the claim that the
level and nature of social mobilization elicited by the presence of mining investment
serve as critical intervening variables in the relationship between investment, rural
development and livelihoods. Posing and exploring this claim is a potentially fruitful line
of enquiry that offers the prospect of complementing existing literature on rural social
movements in which relatively little attention has been paid to the question posed in this
paper – namely the roles of rural social movements in mediating the effects of large scale
capital investment on rural livelihoods and territorial change.

The question is also

important for discussions of rural territorial development (RTD) that have gained
increasing prominence in multilateral agencies (Schejtman and Berdegué, 2003).3 At its
core, the argument for RTD emphasizes that rural development requires both productive
and institutional modernization, as well as conscious efforts to articulate these
modernization processes with a conception of space that recognizes linkages between
urban and rural economies, between on and off-farm activities and between socially
constructed ideas of territory and administrative conceptions of territorial governance.
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At the same time as serving as an analytical framework for understanding the
relationships between economic transformation, institutional change and livelihoods in
given rural spaces, RTD also has a more normative edge as a policy lens for fostering
forms of rural development which connect economic growth with institutional
arrangements and ensure that the rural poor are able to participate in this growth process.
However, the role of conflict in affecting these relationships has received less attention
than has the role of collaboration and coordination. To focus on the effects of social
mobilization on relationships between mining and rural development might therefore
contribute to deepening reflection on the role of conflict in RTD.

With these antecedents, the paper proceeds as follows. The first section outlines
elements of a conceptual framework for exploring possible links between political and
economic context, livelihoods, RTD and social mobilization. This serves as a basis for
the research questions that underlie the empirical analysis. The second section presents
the contexts of each case study, one from Peru and the second from Ecuador, while the
third analyses the relationships between mining investment, social movements and RTD
that have occurred in each case. The final section offers a comparative analysis of these
two cases, and suggests both movement and contextual factors that determine the effects
that social mobilization has on processes of RTD.
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2. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, RURAL LIVELIHOODS AND THE COPRODUCTION OF TERRITORY

In this section we suggest possible relationships between the political economy of
RTD and forms of social mobilization. The case studies in the following section will be
discussed in the light of these possible relationships. In particular we suggest that social
mobilization can be understood as a response to the threats that particular forms of
economic development present, or are perceived as presenting, to the security and
integrity of livelihoods and to the ability of a population in a given territory to control
what it views as its own resources. We also suggest that the extent to which this
mobilization modifies subsequent economic development depends greatly on the relative
power of movements and economic actors (in this case mining companies). This relative
power is determined partly by the roles assumed by other actors (in particular the state)
and to a great extent by the relative strength or weakness of the social movements
themselves. The second subsection considers in more detail some of the factors and
relationships internal and external to movements that might determine their relative
strength.

a) Livelihoods, dispossession and social mobilization

Livelihoods are a function of assets and structures, and a source of subsistence,
income, identity and meaning (Bebbington, 1999; Moser, 1998; Scoones, 1998). Some
social movements seek to expand people's asset bases. Others, however, emerge to
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contest patterns of resource control and access, and to challenge the institutions,
structures and discourses that determine the social distribution of assets, as well as their
relative productivity, security and reproducibility (Bebbington, 2007b).4 Indeed, the
emergence of movements might be understood in terms of their relationship to two
distinct types of accumulation: "accumulation by exploitation" and "accumulation by
dispossession" (Harvey, 2003). The former, workplace centered form of accumulation
has historically generated labor movements, trade unions, and related political
organizations. Conversely, "resistance to accumulation by dispossession (as with the
'privatization' of land and water) has tended to take the form of ‘new’ social movements,
around issues such as land and minority rights" (Hickey and Bracking, 2005: 853).

In this reading, resistance is understood as a defense of livelihood, in which
movements emerge to protect assets by challenging the structures, discourses and
institutions that drive and permit exploitation and dispossession.5 At the same time,
threats to livelihood might also elicit mobilization motivated by the cultural and
psychological losses that might arise when livelihoods are disarticulated (Bebbington,
2004). Habermas has argued that social movements are apt to emerge when people's
lifeworlds – their domains of everyday, meaningful practice - are "colonized" by forces
which threaten these lifeworlds and people's ability to control them (Habermas, 1987;
Crossley, 2002). In the face of this colonization, he suggests that social movements
emerge to defend and recover threatened forms of life and social organization (a similar
view to that of Escobar [1995: 222-226], even if the theoretical basis is distinct). While
Habermas was more interested in the role of the modern, bureaucratic state in this process
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of colonization, the incursion of new forms of investment in rural environments, the
accelerating effects of cultural modernization on traditional practices, and the
disarticulation of existing moral economies (Scott, 1976; Edelman, 2005; Ballard et al.,
2005) might similarly be understood as colonizations of the lifeworld.

When movements have emerged to contest the development of extractive industries,
they might be understood in these terms: as vehicles for contesting both the colonization
of lifeworlds and the material threats to livelihood that flow from Harvey's two processes
of accumulation. Historically, the strongest movements around mining have emerged to
address issues of exploitation: for example, the mine workers union in Bolivia, on the
strength of whose mobilization a large part of Bolivia's 1952 revolution was crafted
(Nash, 1993).6 Such workplace mobilizations continue today – as in the protests during
2006 around workers compensation and benefits at the BHP Billiton-owned La
Escondida mine in Chile (BBC, 2006).7 However, as technology increasingly substitutes
for labor, formal employees become more skilled, and low-skill employees are recruited
on short-term contracts, so conflicts between mine and labor unions have steadily become
less likely and more localized than was the case in earlier decades.8 At the same time,
however, technological changes have turned many once uninteresting mineral deposits
into technically exploitable and commercially viable propositions.

As part of this

process, open-pit techniques have become progressively more important.
techniques greatly increase the surface footprint of the mine.

These

As a result of these

different technological changes, the potential frontier for mining has been pushed deep
into areas already occupied by humans as well as into new drainage basins and areas of
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already threatened ecologies.9 This brings new threats to the material and cultural bases
of livelihood in these and adjacent10 areas, eliciting new types of movement – ones that
contest issues of dispossession and colonization rather than workplace conditions.

The dispossession threatened by this new mining takes various forms. The most
obvious is the dispossession of the land under which minerals are deposited. Here
movements protest against loss of territory and forced land sales at low prices. A second
is the dispossession of the resources themselves, where movements protest the loss to
private (generally foreign) capital of what they perceive to be a national asset. In each of
these instances, dispossession is a question of loss in both the quantity of people's assets
(land, water courses, grazing, and minerals) and the quality of these assets (water and air
pollution). Dispossession might also be understood as loss of a way of life, and a certain
set of taken-for-granted assumptions about livelihood and development.

Finally,

dispossession can be understood as the loss of exchange value that occurs through the tax
and royalty exemptions that companies enjoy at a time of rising commodity prices.

While movements might share a broad concern about dispossession in a general
sense, there can still be considerable diversity among and within movements as to the
specific types of dispossession they are contesting. Likewise, different actors within
movements may offer distinct critiques of the issues that they are addressing, and
different proposals for alternative policies (cf. Perreault, 2006). These alternatives can
range from complete rejection of resource extraction and these new modes of resource
governance, through to demands for greater participation in decision-making regarding
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resource management and more equitable distribution of the economic benefits derived
from resource exploitation. Some groups within movements might be open to deal with
resource extraction companies, others not at all (and vice versa). Some may prefer
strategies of negotiation, others of confrontation and direct action.

These differences have implications for how we conceptualize movements and
understand their relative coherence. They also have implications for the influences that
movements may have on patterns of territorial development in mining affected areas. We
might hypothesize that the positions and strategies that dominate within movements will
have distinct implications for the types of negotiation and articulation that ultimately
occur between movements and resource extraction industries, and thus for the types of
development that ensue from these articulations. At one extreme one can imagine the
existence of movements with unified and forceful positions reflecting their sense that
they are being dispossessed both of a way of life and of exchange value, and who are
unwilling to negotiate.

When successful, such movements can prevent extractive

industries from operating. However, when confronted by an equally intransigent mining
company and a state willing to sanction the use of force, such movements are likely to be
unsuccessful and ultimately repressed and destroyed.

At another extreme one can

hypothesize movements whose concern is to negotiate compensation for dispossession
and/or guarantees against dispossession of asset quality and who would withdraw
contestation once the mining company had put in place plans for environmental
remediation and social compensation. When successful, such movements are able to
negotiate favorable compensation for a broad base of their membership; when
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unsuccessful, the leadership of such movements can be corrupted or be manipulated into
clientelistic relationships in which they ultimately gain little more than trinkets in return
for acquiescence. Among these different options, the type of articulation that ultimately
occurs depends much on the relative strength of movement and mining company, the
vulnerability of movement leaders to cooptation, state postures regarding mining
development, freedoms of association and the right to protest, and on the positions
assumed in these conflicts by public authorities, NGOs, churches, the media or Chambers
of Commerce.

b) Sources of strength and fragility in social movements

Social movements fail to deliver on their agendas as often as they succeed. This
propensity to failure reflects an inherent fragility in movements, one that has to be
understood in terms of their internal dynamics and of the contexts within which they
operate. How far movements are able to manage and overcome their inherent fragilities
goes a long way in determining how far their presence will influence patterns of RTD and
livelihood change.

We take the notion of social movement to refer to processes of collective action that
are sustained across space and time, that reflect grievances around perceived injustices
and that constitute a pursuit of alternative agendas (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992; Escobar,
1995). These processes are frequently multilocational and sometimes transnational, and
are sustained more by shared grievances and discourses than by any clear form of
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articulating social structure. In this sense, movements are much more than individual
organizations. However, organizations are an important part of movement processes.
Indeed, movements frequently depend on formal organizations – in particular because
their actions require financial, human, informational, social and other resources that more
localized and/or informal social networks are unable to mobilize (Crossley, 2002;
McAdam et al., 1988, 2001; Ballard et al., 2005: 627; Andrews, 2001). Such resources
can almost only be channeled by formal "social movement organizations," SMOs
(McCarthy y Zald, 1977) – organizations such as NGOs, churches, student bodies, formal
peasant or ethnic associations, university groups etc. Furthermore, just as movements
might be multilocational and transnational, so these SMOs may also exist at a range of
geographical scales. This is certainly the case in contemporary movements contesting
extractive industries.

Even when their campaigns are focused on territorial

transformations in a given location, these movements often bring together local, national
and international actors (cf. Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Such actors play an important role
in keeping movements "moving" - by maintaining debates, supporting events nurturing
leaders and sustaining networks during those periods when movement activity has slowed
down.

Such organizations also play important roles in forming movement discourses,

although if different SMOs have distinct ideas of how movement discourse should evolve
they can end up pulling a movement in different directions (c.f. McCarthy y Zald, 1977).

Movements are thus constituted by distinct currents, groupings of actors, local
leaderships and SMOs. This breadth is both a source of weakness (because of the
tensions and coordination problems it can lead to) and of power (because it increases the
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reach and geographical presence of movements). In particular, given the different ways
in which groups might understand and be aggrieved about dispossession, and the distinct
views they may have on what ought to be done to remedy such dispossession, holding a
movement process together around a shared agenda and vision is an immensely difficult
feat and always a fragile achievement.

These internal sources of weakness can be compounded by external factors. In
particular, while many livelihoods might be threatened by mineral development, others
will stand to gain, some quite significantly as mineral development creates new
livelihood opportunities. These opportunities may be created through local sourcing of
supplies and services, through increasing levels of demand in the local economy fostered
by mine staff expenditure, through companies' social responsibility programs or through
fiscal transfer programs (Barrantes, 2005). Within a given territory, then, the growth of a
mining economy changes the opportunity structure for a wide range of livelihoods, with
some seeing opportunities where others see dispossession.

These quite differing views of the role of the mine in improving livelihoods can easily
lead to situations in which the social mobilization that emerges to contest mineral
development exists alongside quite distinct forms of mobilization that seek to defend and
support the mine (and that may well receive direct support and encouragement from the
mining company itself). Very often, these two, quite distinct types of mobilization enter
into open conflict. The recent history of Perú has many examples of this phenomenon
and it is present in both our cases. For instance, in 2005, at the same time that local and
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national movements were criticizing the Australian company BHP Billiton for the
adverse effects of its Tintaya mine (in the department of Cusco), Tintaya's own
employees marched in the cities of Cusco and Arequipa in support of the mine. More
recently (August/September 2006), employees of Minera Yanacocha in Cajamarca, Peru
(one of our cases) marched through the city in opposition to the community groups,
NGOs and civic associations that were criticizing the mine.

To the extent that such pro-mine mobilization exists – or at the very least that there
exist a significant number of livelihoods benefited by the growth of a mineral economy –
then the fragility of social movements becomes even more of a constraint on the extent to
which their presence will affect patterns of territorial change. Critical here is the relative
power of these different actors, and the relative importance of the extractive industry
within both the national and territorial economy. Where the industry is that much more
important, one would expect state and other social forces to be more determined to
question, delegitimize and repress movements and more generally expose their internal
fragilities. Likewise the greater the resources at the disposal of other economic actors,
the more able they will be to deepen the inherent fractures in movements. At a more
general level of abstraction, in this triad of relationships among movement, business and
state, it may well be that the outcome of conflicts – and thus of the types of RTD
processes triggered by mining activity – hinge around how far state agencies ultimately
identify with one set of claims over another. The position taken by the state depends in
turn on the relative importance of mining in the national economy and the effectiveness
with which it itself is lobbied by pro- and anti-mine lobbies.
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3. CASE STUDIES

To explore these questions, this study deliberately selected two sites in which the
outcomes of mineral development projects had been radically different, yet which shared
similar time lines and even a number of key social actors. The rationale for this choice
was that the comparison would enable identification of core differences between the two
experiences that might help explain these distinct outcomes. This would help the study
draw attention to factors that have a causal effect on the ways in which social movements
and mineral development interact with each other and ultimately influence patterns of
territorial development.

The first of the two cases comes from the department of Cajamarca in the Northern
Peruvian Andes. More specifically we consider the case of the Yanacocha mine whose
operations are located in the high Andes some 35 km. to the North of the city of
Cajamarca in an area of traditionally peasant populations organized in communities11
(Figure 1). The mine – which we refer to as MYSA12 - is jointly owned by Newmont
Mining Corporation (a US based multinational with head offices in Denver, Colorado)
with a 51.35% share in the ownership, the Peruvian Compañía de Minas Buenaventura
with 43.65%, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) with 5%. MYSA is a
particularly significant mine, not only because it is the largest gold mine in Latin
America, but also because it was the first large scale foreign direct investment in Peru
following the decade of the 1980s lost to hyperinflation and civil war. While exploration
was underway during the 1980s, the first significant investment was made only in 1992
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and the first gold presented to the public in 1993. While initially the company insisted
that the mine would be small, it has grown steadily ever since and currently MYSA
employs some 8000 workers (only 2,243 of whom are regular staff). In the first half of
2006 the Central Reserve Bank of Peru estimated that MYSA's sales reached US$936.5
million, and in 2005 the mine produced 3.3 million ounces of gold, 45 per cent of
national gold production.13
Figure 1: Yanacocha and Cajamarca

Source: Bury 2004
The second case comes from the county (canton) of Cotacachi, located some two
hours' drive to the North of Quito, Ecuador and covering both high altitude grassland
(with a dominantly Quichua population) and humid tropical valleys (with a colonist and
mestizo population). This humid sector, known as Intag, is also the site of a copper
deposit commonly referred to as the Junín deposit (Figure 2), and identified during the
1980s under a geological exploration agreement between the Ecuadorian and Belgian
governments. In 1990 the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) financed
more thorough exploration by the Metal Mining Agency of Japan (MMAJ) that
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confirmed the existence of a large and potentially profitable deposit.

In 1993 the

exploration of the deposit passed to the company Bishi Metals, a subsidiary of
Mitsubishi. However, Bishi Metals abandoned the site in 1997 as a result of escalating
conflict and the concession remained idle until 2002 when it was once again purchased.
By 2004 the concession had been acquired by Ascendant Copper Corporation, a "junior"
mining company incorporated in British Columbia, Canada,14 and in 2005 Ascendant
transferred ownership of the property to its subsidiary Ascendant Ecuador (Ascendant
Copper Corporation, 2005). Though still not developed, this will – like Yanacocha – be
an open-pit mine. Unlike MYSA, however, this (potential) mine operates in a context in
which mining is still unimportant in the national economy, in which there is little history
of mining, and in which the economy – though far from dynamic – is not emerging from
a collapse of the type that occurred in Peru in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Figure 2: The Junin copper deposit in Cotacachi

Source: Own elaboration.
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Both Cajamarca and Cotacachi have become important and emblematic sites in
Peruvian and Ecuadorian debates over the relationships between extractive industries,
rural development and social conflict. Both promised in their early years to help redynamize (in the Peruvian case) or dynamize (in the Ecuadorian case) moribund mining
sectors, both are open-pit projects located in hydrologically sensitive areas, both involve
deposits in already occupied and farmed land, and both have elicited processes of social
mobilization that have become important within wider national environmental
movements questioning extractive industries. In each instance: the mining industry has
argued that external, politically motivated elements are to blame for these levels of social
mobilization; local actors have developed links with international actors, in particular
those linked to the networks of Friends of the Earth International and Bay Area
environmental groups; mobilization has led to acts of violence against property and
persons; national human rights groups and indigenous peoples organizations have
become involved; the local conflicts have become a topic in the respective national
media;15 and central government agencies have been drawn into the conflicts.
Furthermore, partly reflecting the presence of international networks (c.f. Keck and
Sikkink, 1998), the processes of social mobilization in the two sites have over time
become linked, with exchange visits and sharing of information among activists and
organizations working on the two cases.16

And yet, the investment dynamics and

processes of territorial change could hardly have been more distinct. Today, MYSA
reaches across 10,000 ha of the Cajamarcan highlands, an extension exceeding that of the
city of Cajamarca,17 while the Junín mine in Cotacachi is still no more than a base camp
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and an imagined project.

Cajamarca's regional economy has been transformed by

MYSA, whereas Cotacachi's revolves around other economic activities.

These following two case studies ask how such radically different processes over
the same 15-20 year period might be explained, and how much of this difference is due to
the processes of social mobilization that have emerged in the two sites?

a) Cajamarca: multiple mobilizations and mining-led territorial transformation

The acquisition of land is central to the success of an open-pit mine for the obvious
reason that such operations require that the mine own surface as well as sub-surface
rights. Land, however, has long been a point of political contention in the Andes and,
indeed, MYSA's land acquisition program triggered the first rumblings of discontent with
the mine. Interestingly, however, the rumblings were less due to asset loss per se, but
rather the conditions under which land was being acquired. Complaints began to emerge
about prices paid, undue pressure exercised on families to sell their land, people selling
land to the mine that belonged to absent owners rather than them and inflationary
pressures in the local land market. The first stop for these complainants was the parish
church in the area most affected by the early activities of the mine. The priest served to
link the complaints up with the Diocesan human rights office as well as other human
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rights organizations in Peru – organizations which in turn presented the complaints to
MYSA as well as Newmont headquarters in Denver.

While the local Church played the initial role in linking communities up to protosocial movement organizations, this soon came to an end when the priest was sent to
Rome. At this point, however, another actor began to assume this articulating role. This
actor was the nascent federation of rondas campesinas, peasant vigilante groups whose
primary purpose had been to guard against cattle rustling and later assure community
security more generally during the times of rural violence in Peru (Starn, 1999). A
number of people active within the federation were affected by the expansion and land
purchasing activities of the mine, and the federation became a vehicle for contesting these
adverse impacts (Chacón Pagan, 2005). The federation (FEROCAFENOP) began to
organize protests in Cajamarca itself and further developed its links to international
environmental groups (in particular in the Bay Area of the US)18 – links that also helped
it engage in advocacy in the US. In the process, their complaints became more visible
nationally and internationally, although federation activists of this period remember it as
one when international support and involvement was far greater than support from urban
Cajamarca for whom these rural grievances passed as largely invisible and irrelevant.
Significantly, though, notwithstanding the grievances that peasants and the Federation
had with the mine, the protest during this period was not so much oriented towards
getting rid of MYSA19 as to demanding a different relationship between mine and
communities: a relationship characterized by fair compensation, more civil treatment, and
greater participation in the benefits that the mine was generating.
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As the process of organization and mobilization was underway in Cajamarca, a
similar process was occurring at a national level (de Echave and Pasco-Font, 1999) – a
reflection of the rapid increase in mining investments and conflicts during the mid- and
late-1990s. This process culminated in the creation of a National Coordinator of Mine
Affected Communities, or CONACAMI in Spanish (de Echave and Pasco-Font, 1999).
Activists in Cajamarca were an important part of this process, and initially the idea was
that the Federation of rondas would be the Cajamarca branch of CONACAMI. However,
a series of conflicts between different interest groups, party political currents and leaders
(locally and nationally) meant that this alliance was short-lived, and CONACAMI was
never able to establish a significant base in Cajamarca.

Meanwhile, the struggles

between different leaderships both within and among organizations in Cajamarca began
to weaken both the Federation and the more general process of social mobilization.

Meanwhile, concerns about the mine were beginning to grow in the city of Cajamarca
– not so much because of any sympathy with the plight of rural communities but rather
because of the accumulating evidence that the mine was beginning to have adverse
effects on the quality of the urban water supply (Ecovida, 2005; Seifert, 2003). A
mercury spill from a mine truck in the village of Choropampa in 2000 further
consolidated these concerns while also gaining far greater international attention because
of a highly successful video (supported financially and distributed by several
international SMOs) that documented the spill and gave visual form to the less than
sensitive ways in which both mine and government responded to the complaints and
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mobilization of Choropampa's residents. Urban environmentalist groups that had begun
to emerge at around the same time found themselves somewhat strengthened by these
events, as did the coordinating group that had begun to work across these different
organizations.

Around the same time as these publicly visible environmental failures of the mine,
MYSA finally succeeded in channeling some its social responsibility program finance to
FEROCAFENOP,20 the federation that had for so long been the main organized face of
rural contention against the actions of the mine. When this became publicly known, the
legitimacy and power of the federation rapidly weakened (and any remaining links with
CONACAMI were cut by CONACAMI). As a direct consequence, the anchor of the
social movement around the mine quickly shifted from rural to urban organizations, and
from organizations based in rural community groups to ones based in urban intelligentsia
and professional groups. In the process, movement discourses also began to change.
While the rural movement of the 90s had been openly confrontational, it had been neither
an environmental movement nor an anti-mining movement.

Instead it had been a

movement that was more concerned to demand fair treatment and adequate compensation
for the forms of dispossession that had occurred in rural communities, and a fuller
inclusion of rural people in the mine's activities. In this sense it might be argued that it
sought a far clearer and more synergistic articulation of the mining economy and rural
livelihoods – rather than the enclave and dispossession model of mining that dominated
in the 1990s.21 With the shift to an urban-led movement, the movement discourse
became increasingly a mix of environmentalism and/or of calls for greater national and
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state participation in both the governance of the mine and the control of its profits. The
politics of peasant protest (both populist and radical) were increasingly crowded out by
those of an urban environmental left characterized by its own internal differences on the
place of mining in the regional economy. This is not to say that peasant protest and
mobilization disappeared – indeed, it continued to play an important part in future
conflicts with the mine (see below). However, the actors who increasingly defined the
debates within which these protests were interpreted were urban – intellectuals, NGOs,
occasionally local authorities.22

Environmental concerns remained at the forefront of debate in Cajamarca during the
early 2000s, as arguments emerged about whether mercury had seeped into the urban
water supply or not, and over whether the overall quantity of this supply was being
threatened (Ecovida, 2005). At the centre of this latter discussion was an argument about
MYSA's desire to expand operations into an area known as Cerro Quilish. Initial peasant
protests against this expansion in the late 1990s had ultimately led to a municipal
ordinance that declared Quilish a protected area on the grounds that it was the source of
the cities' water supply. The ordinance was, however, contested by MYSA, and after
drawn out legal proceedings, a Constitutional Tribunal concluded that the mine's rights to
explore in Quilish preceded and were co-terminus with the powers of the municipality to
declare it a protected area.

In July 2004, on the basis of this judgment and an

environmental impact assessment, the central government gave MYSA the right to recommence exploration on Quilish. Immediately, protests erupted and quickly escalated
to the point that the city of Cajamarca and the mine were effectively paralyzed until the
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central government once more shifted its stance. Confronted with a situation in which its
"social license to operate" seemed increasingly in the balance, MYSA withdrew its
request for permission to explore in Quilish (though MYSA argues that in the future it
may once again exercise this right). In an effort to take advantage of the situation
movement leaders called for the creation of a negotiating table to which they committed
to bring forward proposals for avoiding future conflicts. After several months, this
demand was finally conceded, yet the movement was ultimately unable to exploit the
opportunity it afforded. Because of differences of opinion among civil society actors, as
well as stalling practices by state and mine, actors could not agree on who would sit at
this negotiating table. Again, the movement lost the initiative.

While ostensibly the protests over Cerro Quilish were over water, some
commentators argued that underlying the intensity of feeling among many of the
protestors was a deeper grievance - an annoyance at the arrogant behavior of the mine
and its employees and over the increasingly conspicuous consumption associated with
mine employment and indicative of growing inequalities within the Cajamarcan middle
and upper-middle classes (Gorriti, 2004).

In this sense, the mobilizations brought

together groups motivated by quite different concerns: worries over threats to rural water;
concerns for the supply of urban water; desires to see the mine subject to national
ownership; annoyance at the relative loss of middle and upper-middle class status and
authority; and annoyance at the seeming impenetrability of the mine and its unwillingness
to listen.

These positions ranged from anti-mining, to pro-mining, to commitments to

distinct ways of governing mining.
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As the process of social mobilization has unfolded in Cajamarca, it has incorporated a
growing number of actors. These actors, while united by a general sense that MYSA has
dispossessed them of something, differ in the specific nature of their concerns. In this
sense, while the movement channels grievance it has not channeled any coherent,
alternative proposal for livelihoods and territorial development, not least because the
actors who make up the movement have quite different positions on if, and how, mining
should proceed in the region.

The existence of these internal differences has not meant that the movement has had
no effect on the relationship between mining, livelihoods and development in Cajamarca.
Indeed, the mine has changed some of its practices as a result of these mobilizations and
protests.

Furthermore, it appears to have been more responsive since the movement

"urbanized" – viewing such urbanized protest as ultimately more threatening than purely
peasant protest. Thus, between 1999 and 2004 MYSA's investments in environmental
remediation almost trebled while those in social responsibility increased almost ninefold
(Morel, 2005).23 These programs have been shown to increase the financial and human
capital asset bases of household livelihoods, while weakening their social capital (Bury,
2004, 2007).24 Protest has also forced some rethinking of expansion plans, as evidenced
in the mine’s withdrawal from Quilish. It has not, though, broken its tendency to
combine social responsibility programs with practices of intimidation against activists
and others who appear to stand in its way, nor has it stopped the overall expansion of the
mine. This expansion, which demands access to both land and water, continues to
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transform livelihood options in the areas directly affected, primarily through its effects on
the natural capital assets on which many livelihoods depend. Meanwhile, and perhaps
more importantly, the money spent by MYSA in local contracting and purchasing
increased almost sevenfold over the same period – a direct response to urban criticisms
that the mine operated too much as an enclave (cf. Kuramoto, 2004a, b). This response
increases greatly the urban stake in the continued activities of the mine.

b) Cotacachi: articulated movement and truncated mining

While in Cotacachi the initial granting of mining concessions was – as in Cajamarca a process that happened off stage and in the capital city, in this case external actors
became aware of these concessions before any significant mining development had occur
red. They then passed this information to local actors, and slowly a process of social
mobilization unfolded that preceded mining activity. Although this has ultimately proven
to be critical in influencing subsequent territorial and livelihood dynamics in Cotacachi, it
occurred largely by accident. A Bay Area environmental NGO had become aware of
Japanese mining interests in Northern Ecuador, and mentioned this to one of their
Ecuadorian counterparts, Acción Ecológica (until recently a part of Friends of the Earth
International). Acción Ecológica began to pursue the case and soon made contact with
communities in the Intag zone of Cotacachi. They then began environmental education
activities oriented towards making communities aware of the costs of mineral-led
development and, indeed, towards generating strong local opposition to mining.25 At the
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same time, as in Cajamarca, a parish priest began speaking of the risks of mining in the
area both from the pulpit and in his activities with a local youth group. In parallel,
though completely unrelated, a small-scale ecotourism entrepreneur and environmentalist
had begun working with a different youth group on environmental issues (though not
mining). Soon, however, these three processes converged and local actors began to speak
more explicitly about mining and the risks it would imply for environment and society in
Intag. Though not using a language of dispossession or colonization (cf. Harvey, 2003;
Habermas, 1987), these groups began developing the argument that an irruption of
mining into the area would colonize ways of life that residents had largely taken for
granted and steadily dispossess them of a landscape, environmental quality and form of
society that they had until then taken for-granted. With time a hard line emerged, further
solidified by residents' personal experiences during Acción Ecológica-sponsored visits to
other mining sites in Ecuador and Peru, the effects of which were to create a strong antimining sentiment among participants.

This process led to the formation of the first explicit SMOs in Intag: DECOIN, an
NGO that brought together the two youth groups, the priest and the ecotourism
entrepreneur and environmentalist; and a community-based organization in the areas
most directly affected by the mine concession. In 1997 this committee ultimately decided
to attack and burn down the mine camp. This event not only led Bishi Metals to
withdraw, it also pulled both the central and local state more deeply into the conflict. A
ministerial visit led to a central government position that – unlike the Cajamarca case –
did not automatically assume a pro-mine stance. Meanwhile, the local government
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played a role of intermediary in the conflict at the same time as it created spaces that
ultimately allowed this incipient movement to become stronger.

As in the case of the arrival of Acción Ecológica to Intag, there was an element of
serendipity surrounding the relationship between the process of social mobilization and
the local state. In 1996, the national indigenous movement decided to present candidates
for municipal elections. On the wave of the increasing strength of the movement, and the
increasing visibility of indigenous issues in national political debate, several of these
candidates won mayorships. One of these was Cotacachi,26 and the elected mayor (still in
power in 2006) initiated a model of municipal governance that emphasized participatory
planning and the steady incorporation of a range of social actors into municipal affairs. A
centerpiece of this model was the creation of the Assembly for Cantonal Unity (AUC in
Spanish), a non-governmental counterpart of the municipality that was designed as a
vehicle to monitor local government, foster organized links between the municipality and
the canton's population, and host a range of social change initiatives in the canton. One
of these activities revolved around environmental issues, and the AUC hosted a newly
created Committee for Environment Management (CGA in Spanish). This space was
partly created and then assertively taken by DECOIN and other groups in Intag. Through
this space they succeeded in getting Cotacachi to pass a municipal ordinance declaring
itself an "ecological canton" that, inter alia, rejected any place for mining in territorial
development activities.27
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In 1996 the electoral position of the mayor of Cotacachi (Auki Tituaña) was neither
environmental nor anti-mining.

However, by creating vehicles for organized

participation in municipal affairs he allowed the emerging environmental movement to
move beyond Intag and project itself canton-wide. This in turn allowed it to develop
links and promote its agenda with both urban and highland groups such that by 2005
seventy-one per cent of the canton said that mining was prejudicial to nature and people,
and only 29 per cent felt that mining should be allowed in the canton (Ospina et al, 2006).
Just as importantly, highland indigenous organizations in the canton and the province of
Imbabura began to offer their political support should Intag ever need it to resist the entry
of mining. Partly as a consequence of such changes – as well as any of his own personal
convictions – the mayor began to assume a more clearly environmental position in
subsequent electoral campaigns.

The departure of Bishi metals in 1997, and the absence of any mining related actions
until 2002, gave these movement organizations the chance to consolidate themselves,
develop a series of national and international links, mobilize resources and also elaborate
proposals for forms of rural development that would not be based on mining. In this
process, they were helped by the fact that Cotacachi was a nationally and internationally
visible canton as a result of the local governance experiments underway there. These
experiments attracted NGOs and volunteers to the canton, and so increased the
availability of financial and technical resources. The links to Acción Ecológica also
helped to make the case more visible nationally and internationally (as did books
published by local residents: Fluweger, 1998), though the lead activists in DECOIN and
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later in the AUC also dedicated considerable effort to opening up these links. The
willingness in later years of the mayor to publicly assume visible positions critical of
mining, and to write directly to international groups on the same issue, also helped.

These linkages served a range of specific purposes which, taken as a whole, sought to
prevent mining from taking root in Cotacachi. Some links were developed in order to
pursue legal actions against mining, others to build solidarity relationships, and others to
mobilize funds to support local development initiatives.

Indeed, both SMOs and the

municipality invested considerable resources in this period to develop new economic
activities in Intag, in particular organic coffee production and marketing, handicrafts, and
community managed ecotourism. The rationale for this work was the notion that "we are
convinced that, if we are to block mining, we must offer practical productive alternatives
… that generate employment."

Throughout the process – and in particular via the

activities of the AUC – all this was combined with a sustained program of environmental
education in schools and communities. This time spent consolidating organizations and
generating a more or less shared view of territorial development that was grounded in
rural livelihoods rather than mining was something that SMOs in Cajamarca did not
enjoy. Thus, when in 2002 the mine concession was once again activated, and when in
2004 it was acquired by Ascendant Copper, both SMOs and the environmental movement
more generally were consolidated and enjoyed a far wider set of local, national and
international linkages than they did in 1997.
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Once Ascendant acquired the concession it sought to re-commence exploration
activities. As part of its entry strategy it began a program of community relations that
sought to develop the community links on which access to the exploration site depended.
While this generated some local support (and thus also conflict with anti-mining
organizations and activists), the companies' own financial limitations meant that it was
unable to operate a social investment program at anything like the level of MYSA. Nor
was it able to do any significant local sourcing of services or inputs. Consequently, it has
not yet had any significant effects on local or urban livelihoods, and there are very few
people whose livelihood opportunities depend in any measure on the existence of the
mine. This has made it easier for movement organizations to keep the social movement
and its shared environmental agenda relatively coherent and intact – as reflected in the
figures quoted above on the level of anti-mining sentiment in the canton.

This situation – along with the need for investment capital – has made it vital that
Ascendant raise finance on the stock market (up to late 2005 its resources were limited to
those of its Directors). This capital is necessary not only to develop mining operations,
but also to create the incentives that would lead at least an important part of the local
population to see their livelihoods as depending on the mine. To do this it began
proceedings to get itself listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange in order to sell shares.
This elicited a response from SMOs in Cotacachi, the US, Europe and Canada that sought
to challenge the accuracy of Ascendant's stock offering prospectus and thus prevent it
from acquiring the approval necessary for it to be listed on the Toronto market. While
this effort succeeded in slowing down this approval it ultimately failed and in November
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2005 Ascendant's first shares were sold (Ascendant Copper Corporation, 2005). Less
than three weeks later, members of the settlements located near to the proposed mine
once again attacked and burnt down the mine's centre of operations (Canadian Press,
2005; DECOIN, 2005).

To date, though conflict continues, there is still no significant exploration underway.28
In this sense movement processes have so far resisted any forms of dispossession that
might otherwise have accompanied mining. Mining has, however, already transformed
Intag. Activists and community leaders alike speak of the fact that they now have to live
the rest of their lives knowing that there are potentially exploitable mineral resources
under their feet, and that such exploitation may one day become a reality. In this sense,
the very idea of mining, and the possibility that at some future date Intag may become a
mining district, has colonized people's lifeworlds in a way that is, to all intents and
purposes, permanent. Their certainties and ideas about the future will never be the same
again.

4. CONCLUSIONS: CO-PRODUCTION, DISPOSSESSION AND
MOBILIZATION

Accumulation dynamics have led to the experience of dispossession in Cajamarca,
and the threat of dispossession in Cotacachi. In each instance, lifeworlds have been
irrevocably changed: in Cotacachi because, with or without a mine, residents will forever
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live with the knowledge that dramatic landscape and economic change may be just
around the corner; and in Cajamarca, because the dispossessions and opportunities
afforded by the mine, and the prospect of many more mines in the immediate future, have
changed the meaning and experience of life in the region.

One of the consequences of these experienced and threatened dispossessions in the
two regions has been the emergence of social movements contesting and seeking to
rework the lifeworld and territorial transformations associated with extractive industries.
These movements have had clear effects on the nature of rural territorial development
and in each case have become an important actor in the co-production of territory and
livelihood (cf. Bebbington, 2000). The emergence of these new actors reflects the very
distinct projects and visions for development co-exsiting within these territories. As such
they constitute efforts to defend territories and pursue alternative agendas and politics in
a way that Escobar and others have suggested lies at the core of what social movements
are (Escobar, 1995).

The conflicts that have ensued remind us that while the co-

production of territory and livelihood might be based on synergies and complementarities
(Evans, 1996; Ostrom, 1996), it is just as likely to be grounded in conflict. The conflicts
also make clear that any concept of co-production has also to be linked to one of power,
for the post-1990 dynamics of co-production in Cotacachi and Cajamarca have been quite
different, primarily because of the different power relationships between social
movements and mining companies. These distinct power relationships also reflect the
quite different ways in which the local dynamics of accumulation have become part of
national and international dynamics.
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The distinct trajectories of territorial change in the two cases reflect differences in the
relative power of the mining company, the relative fragility and power of the social
movement, and the role of government. In both cases, the relative power of the mining
companies is defined, obviously, by company size and the resources that it can use to
manage and dissipate conflicts. However, it is also the case that the resources currently
available to MYSA for social programs are a direct effect of the growth in its operations.
Back in 1992 MYSA had few spare resources for social investment – in that sense, at that
time its situation was not greatly different from that of Ascendant's today. This points to
other important differences between the two cases: the ways in which events have been
sequenced and the relative importance of mining in the two national economies. MYSA's
current power owes much to the fact that it constituted the first important foreign direct
investment after an extended period of crisis in Peru. This gave it singular popularity
during its early years and allowed it to become an established local and national actor
prior to any significant social mobilization. This – coupled with urban and metropolitan
indifference to the implications of the mine for rural livelihoods – meant that MYSA was
able to initiate a process of accumulation through dispossession that subsequently
generated the resources it later required to finance social responsibility and other
additional expenditure needed to protect its accumulation strategy. Furthermore, the
importance of the mining sector within the Peruvian economy, as well as the specific
importance of MYSA’s gold as a source of tax income and foreign currency, has meant
that the state has rarely spoken out against MYSA or in support of social movements.
Indeed, the last two years in Peru have seen a clear hardening of its position against
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movements that question mining – a hardening in which state military and intelligence
services have mobilized to resist and investigate such movements.

On those few

occasions when parts of the state have been critical of forms of mineral expansion, such
criticisms have come from regional politicians seeking political advantage, or from parts
of the People's Ombudsman's office (Bebbington et al., 2007a). Meanwhile, the financial
support that MYSA provides to the local forces of law and order enhance its leverage
over the state.

In Cotacachi, each of these factors is distinct. Ecuador's economy depends far more
on hydrocarbons than minerals, Ascendant is a small junior company struggling to raise
capital from sources other than its own Directors, and the process of social mobilization
preceded the arrival of the company leaving a heritage of memories of successful
resistance among the bases of the movement. While the central state has provided strong
support neither to company nor to movement (its messages have varied over time and
depending on the ministry in question), the municipal government has become
progressively more supportive of the movement's agenda. As noted, this is partly an
accident of history, in which a candidate of the national indigenous movement won the
mayoralty in 1996, proved to be a skilled manager and for both personal and political
reasons became increasingly concerned over the environment. More importantly, this
mayor and his commitment to participatory forms of governance allowed SMOs to
colonize parts of the local state and to place their agenda on the municipal agenda. At the
same time, municipal initiatives and support have helped SMOs craft defensible
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economic alternatives to mining. If in Cajamarca the social movement lacks serious
state-political patrons, in Cotacachi the mining company lacks these allies.

Perhaps most critical, however, is that in Cotacachi actors within the movement have
been able to manage internal differences and so retain a coherent, shared agenda on
territorial development and the place of mining within it. In the process they have been
able to recruit progressively more support in areas not directly affected by the proposed
mine (a process greatly assisted by their leverage within municipal government). In
Cajamarca this has not occurred.

The movement has been characterized by more

struggles over leadership and by the presence of different currents with quite distinct
views on development, politics and the place of mining in the regional economy. Also,
the forms of non-agrarian (largely urban) opportunity promoted by the existence of
MYSA has meant that a large part of the urban (and significant elements within the rural)
population are in favor of mineral-led territorial development. The wealth of the mine
has also meant that through its social programs and its subcontracting practices it has
been able to cultivate support, creating a series of incentives that movement actors find
hard to contest. Indeed, they may often respond to these same incentives themselves as
for instance when FEROCAFENOP accepted MYSA funding, or when staff of
organizations critical of the mines end up accepting employment with the mine.29

Transnational linkages have been of great importance for both movements.

In

addition to the financial resources that these have made available, they have also
facilitated access to spaces of debate with company head offices (in the case of MYSA),
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with investors, with North American lawyers, and with broader solidarity networks.
These contacts serve as sources of moral support and encouragement for local activists,
and occasionally also as sources of additional human and financial resources, as well as
vehicles for advocacy activities. While this endorses arguments about the importance of
transnational linkages in contemporary environmental and human rights politics (Keck
and Sikkink, 1998),30 the comparison also suggests that such transnational relations have
not been the central factor in determining outcomes in the two cases. They are equally
present in the two cases, and indeed many of the networks are similar (those of Friends of
the Earth International, Oxfam America and Bay Area environmental networks) – yet the
outcomes in Cotacachi and Cajamarca are distinct. The implication is that national and
local factors, the unique political economies in which each case has unfolded, and the
dynamics internal to local movements, each continue to be at least as important in
determining the extent to which social movements are able to refashion patterns of
development, and thus in determining the forms and outcomes of co-production that
come to dominate territorial restructuring and livelihood transformation. By the same
token, while analytical attention to the roles played by international groups is important,
this should not distract attention from the continuing importance of national
environmental and human rights organizations and individuals. In both our case studies,
these groups and persons have provided important technical, legal and moral support to
movement processes, have helped raise the visibility of these conflicts in national
debates, and have provided information and training to more locally based social
movement organizations. While themselves often linked to international organizations,
these actors are far more than mere appendages within transnational networks. Their own
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histories, agendas, relationships, capacities and positions have important effects on the
trajectories of local conflicts over mining and development.

The cases have various implications for RTD – understood as both a concept of and
proposal for rural development.

Here we highlight three.

First, while a focus on

territorially based dynamics is very welcome (indeed three of us are geographers), it
must come together with a sensitivity to relationships of scale. Territories cannot be
understood independently of the scaled economic, political and social relations in which
they are embedded and which, indeed, have significant influence on the very social
processes through which a particular territory is constituted. Second, while the focus on
institutional transformation is also welcome, it is important to avoid using a language of
institutions as a way of eliding attention to politics and relationships of power. These
cases make clear just how contested rural development is, and how far power
relationships influence the models of development that ultimately rise to ascendancy.
Third, it is critical not to speak of development in the singular. The cases make evident
the sense in which – within a territory – competing models and concepts of development
coexist in relations sometimes of conflict, sometimes of synergy. Indeed, one of the
lessons from such conflictive cases as these is that a viable RTD is likely to be one that is
able to accommodate a range of quite distinct visions and one that builds the social
relationships and institutions that are necessary for mediating the conflicts that will
inevitably arise among these distinct visions.

38

We close by returning to our opening reflection on livelihoods, RTD and social
movements. The analysis here makes clear that the institutions, structures and discourses
that govern asset distribution, security and productivity are not pre-given. They are
struggled over, re-worked and co-produced through the actions and interactions of a
range of market, state and civil society actors. While new forms of capital investment
and market integration are particularly influential in these processes of co-production, our
cases make clear that social movements also co-determine the forms taken by the
institutions, structures and discourses that structure RTD and livelihoods.

These

movements have forced debate on the desirability of mineral led forms of rural
development and the institutional and livelihood changes that these would necessarily
require; they have struggled to protect certain institutions while challenging others; and
they have elicited changes in accumulation dynamics and processes of dispossession.
Their emergence embodies the existence of subaltern and contentious views on rural
development, and modifies the material nature and meanings associated with the forms of
rural development that ultimately unfold. It therefore behooves analysts and activists
alike to understand how the presence (and absence) of movements affects – and will
affect - the new territorial dynamics currently unfolding in Latin America.
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2

These are the departments of Cajamarca, Cusco and Huancavelica. Peru is divided administratively into
departments (now referred to as regions) which are in turn subdivided into provinces, districts and yet more
local level administrations. Ecuador is divided administratively into provinces, which are in turn
subdivided into cantons which in turn are composed of parishes.

3

RTD will, for instance, feature in the in World Bank's 2008 World Development Report on agriculture,
occupies a central place in the Inter-American Development Bank's current rural development policy and
strategy, and is prominent in discussions in IFAD.

4

Many phenomena might fall under this category of institutions, some more formal, others more social and
relational. The former might include land tenure rules, subsoil ownership rights, environmental regulation
standards, rules governing access to and provision of health care and education etc. The latter (which
interact with the former) may include relationships of race, ethnicity, gender, region and class that also
have significant implications for access, control, security, use and reproduction of resources.

5

For the specific case of the Peruvian Andes, Gavin Smith has explored in dense ethnographic and
historical detail the many ways in which resistance and livelihood are linked (Smith, 1989). For a slightly
more general discussion of this link see Bebbington, 2004.
6

In Peru, Long and Roberts (1984) also dealt with such labor disputes in the central highlands.

7
BBC, 2006. "Chile copper miners' strike ends"
Accessed on September 1st, 2006.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5304404.stm.

8

This point needs some qualification, however, because during 2007 in Peru, mine worker union conflicts
became more frequent and in at least one instance national strike action was called for. However, it may
also be that this spurt in militancy occurred as unions took advantage of – or became part of – the more
general increase in national concern about the extraordinary profits being made by mining companies as a
result of mineral price rises.

9

A further technical change in the high Andes is the "mineral duct," a mining version of oil and gas
pipelines. These ducts run from the high altitude mine site down to the coast to ore-treatment plants and
ports from which the ore is exported. This is the case, for instance, in the Antamina mine in Peru, which
Bridge's survey (2004: 413) concludes was the world's single largest mine investment between 1990 and
2001. Here a duct runs 302 km to the coast (http://www.antamina.com/02_operacion/En_concen_03.html).
A similar duct has also been discussed for the very contentious Majaz/Rio Blanco project in Piura (see
Bebbington et al., 2007). These ducts run through farmed land and can trigger other conflicts along their
course.

10

In those instances where mineral expansion threatens water sources for downstream populations.
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11

These communities are generally not as strong as those in the Central and Southern Andes of Peru. Also
their members are Spanish-speaking and tend to identify themselves as “campesino” rather than
“indigenous” (Chacón Pagán, 2004: 363).

12

This is for its acronym in Spanish, Minera Yanacocha Sociedad Anónima.

13

El Comercio, 29th August, 2006 page B1.

14

Its main office is, however, located in Lakewood, Colorado

15

Albeit much more so in the case of Cajamarca than that of Cotacachi.

16

Again, for reasons of transparency it must be noted that some of this interaction derived from this study.
However, there had already been exchanges between the two cases.

17

In addition it owns 1386km2 of mineral rights, and has explicit plans to continue expanding. Data are
from Bury (2005), Yanacocha (2005) and www.yanacocha.com.pe
18

Especially the now-defunct Project Underground (2003, 1999).

19

Though at one point, there appears to have been a plan to attack the mine site – Project Underground
dissuaded the federation from pursuing this option.

20

We remain unable to explain how this occurred. It is a case so full of mutual recriminations that it is
difficult to know what actually happened. What is clear is (i) that the mine had already invested (through
its hiring practices) in finding ways into social movement organizations and (ii) that at least some of the
leaders of the federation were always more of a mind to ensure adequate community compensation for the
mine rather than the closure of the mine. These two postures certainly helped make this financial flow
possible.
21
Even more forgiving studies, in part supported by MYSA, viewed the mine as something of an enclave
(Kuramoto, 2004a,b; see also Dirven, 2006).
22

Chacón (2004: 3) puts it far more forcefully and cynically. Speaking of protests in Bambamarca, a
community near Cajamarca, and the Choropampa protest itself, he states (our translation): “in general, the
terms of debate are defined by the latter, specifically provincial political authorities and intellectuals, while
the former, above all the rondas campesinas, sound the initial bell, and then serve as the sacrificial lamb."

23

However, MYSA profits also grew significantly over the same period.

24

Bury draws particular attention to the weakening of community based organizations and of household
social networks and relationships of trust.
25

Acción Ecológica is opposed to mineral development in Ecuador.

26

Another was Guamote, discussed in Bebbington, 2000.

27

See Municipalidad de Santa Ana de Cotacachi, 2000.

28

In September 2007, the Ministry of Energy and Mines required Ascendant to suspend all its activities on
the grounds that it did not have the support of the Municipality of Cotacachi. This does not suspend the
concession, and the Minister left open the possibility that the company could return if it could reach a
negotiated agreement to do so with the communities and local government. However, this decision can be
seen as a further "win" for the social movement in Cotacachi.
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29

For instance, a member of Grufides in Cajamarca went to work for MYSA's social development program
in 2005.

30

As well as the efforts of transnational activists.
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